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Abstract
In this document, a privacy-preserving distributed profile matching
protocol is proposed in a particular network context called mobile social
network. Such networks are often deployed in more or less hostile en-
vironments, requiring rigorous security mechanisms. In the same time,
energy and computational resources are limited as these heterogeneous
networks are frequently constituted by wireless components like tablets
or mobile phones. This is why a new encryption algorithm having an
high level of security while preserving resources is proposed in this paper.
The approach is based on elliptic curve cryptography, more specifically
on an almost completely homomorphic cryptosystem over a supersingular
elliptic curve, leading to a secure and efficient preservation of privacy in
distributed profile matching.
1 Introduction
Social networking websites, like Facebook [6] with its 900 million active users
or Google+ [7], are of widespread use in our connected and globalized world.
A major trend of these social networks is to attempt to provide instant and
real-time access to for users, whatever their location and the connected device
they use. This sensible demand from users has led to the development of mobile
social networking (MSN) software like Foursquare [9] and Gowalla [8], in which
individuals with similar interests are connected together and converse with one
another through either tablets or mobile phone. In that approach, mobile apps
use existing social networks to create native communities and promote discovery,
leading to an improvement of web-based social networks using mobile features
and accessibility. Making new connections according to personal preferences
is a crucial service in MSN, where the initiating user can find matching users
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within physical proximity of him/her. In existing systems for such services,
usually all the users directly publish their complete profiles for others to search.
However, in many applications, the usersâĂŹ personal profiles may contain sen-
sitive information that they do not want to make public. Authors of [10] have
presented FindU, a first privacy-preserving personal profile matching scheme,
designed for mobile social networks. In FindU, an initiating user can find from
a group of users the one whose profile best matches with his/her; to limit the
risk of privacy exposure, only necessary and minimal information about the
private attributes of the participating users is exchanged. They speak about a
Blind and Permute (BP) protocol. Several increasing levels of user privacy are
defined, with decreasing amounts of exchanged profile information. Authors of
this document propose to use a different encryption scheme into the BP algo-
rithm. This new scheme can provide a similar level of security while reducing
drastically the computation and communication costs, which is critical in the
MSN context. In BP algorithm, encryption over ciphertexts is required. The
original method proposed in [10] achieves this requirement using a cryptosys-
tem [12] that needs a lot of resources, which is quite incompatible with the
constraints related to MSNs. Contrarily, the scheme proposed here is based on
elliptic curve cryptography [15], which leads to smaller keys and cryptograms,
low cost computations and shorter communication messages, reducing largely
by doing so the batteries consumptions. The remainder of this document is or-
ganized as follows. In Section 2, related works in the field of privacy-preserving
profile matching are proposed. Then, in Section 3, we give recall the FindU
protocol with related definitions. We give the protocol BP in Section 4. We
construct the homomorphism encryption in Section 5 and we use it in Section
6 with performance analysis in Section 7. Section 8 conclude this work.
2 Related Works
The methods used in the field of privacy-preserving distributed profile matching
are usually classified into three main categories according to the cryptographic
tools they use. In protocols based on oblivious polynomial evaluation, client
and a server compute the intersection of the sets corresponding to their profiles,
such that the client gets the result while server learns nothing. Homomor-
phic encryption that allows operations over cipher texts is used to evaluate a
polynomial that represents clientaĂŹs input obviously. This method has been
originally proposed in [3], through the FNP scheme. Other examples lying in
the same category can be found, for instance, in [4] and [5]. These methods
are however impracticable in MSNs because they do not achieve linear com-
putational complexity. Protocols based on oblivious pseudorandom functions
consist of two parties that securely compute a pseudorandom function, where
one of them holds the key while the other provides the input (set elements).
The objective is a secure set intersection. Suppose two parties with private sets
wish to learn the intersection set without revealing anything else. Let P1 and
P2 be two parties that have input X and Y respectively and F a pseudorandom
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function, while k is a key for F belonging to P1. P2 compute {Fk(y)}y∈Y and
P1 compute {Fk(x)}x∈X and send the results to P2. Thus, P2 compare which
elements appear in both sets to learn the intersection [2]. The complexity of
this method is smaller than the first. The last category consists of protocols
based on so-called commutative encryption. An encryption scheme Ek(Âů)
is said to have the commutative property when, for all keys k1 and k2, we
have: Ek1(Ek2(x)) = Ek2(Ek1 (x)). For instance, the well known RSA encryp-
tion scheme has this commutative property. The main idea when considering
privacy-preserving profile matching is thus to use the commutative encryption
as a keyed one-way hash function, to generate a mapping for each element x
such that no party knows the key [1]. A commonly related disadvantage of
this method is that it often provide a weaker security[10]. Authors of [10] have
presented a privacy-preserving profile matching called FindU. FindU is a sym-
metric protocol , i.e., the output is known at the same time by all parties. The
characteristics of this scheme is further detailed in the next section.
3 The FindU Protocol
3.1 Problem Definition
In mobile social networks, devices are wirelessly connected (using wireless in-
terfaces such as bluetooth or wifi), thus resources are limited and a certain level
of security is required. Authors of FindU algorithm suppose that the connexion
is established under public key cryptosystem, where keys are distributed over
parties securely. Then, when a party launches a matching, BP algorithm as-
sure sharing a secret securely. Let us define these stages more precisely. The
system consists of N users (parties) denoted as P1, ..., PN , each possessing a
portable device. We denote the initiation party (initiator) as P1. P1 launches
the matching process and its goal is to find one party that best matches with
it, from the rest of the parties P2, ..., PN that are called candidates. Each party
Pi’s profile consists of a set of attributes Si, which can be strings up to a certain
length. P1 defines a matching query to be a subset of S1 (in the following we
use S1 to denote the query set unless specified). Also, we denote n = |S1| and
m = |Si|, i > 1, assuming that each candidate has the same set length for the
sake of simplicity. Let us now introduce the following definitions.
Definition 1. The match of the set Si, i ∈ {2, âĂę, N}, is by definition the
cardinality of S1
⋂
Si.
Definition 2. The best match Pi∗ is defined as the party having the maximum
intersection set size with P1.
P1 will first find out Pi∗ via the proposed protocol. Then they will decide
whether to connect with other based on their actual intersection set.
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3.2 Adversary Models
If a party obtains one or more (partial or full) attribute sets without the explicit
consents from these users, we said he has achieved an user profiling. In that
context, the two following levels of security can be defined [10].
• Honest-but-Curious (HBC) adversary. In this model, the attacker
tries to learn more information than what is allowed, by inferring from
the results while honestly following the protocol.
• Malicious adversary. The attacker tries here to learn more information
than allowed by deviating from the protocol run.
3.3 Design Goals
Here we intend to develop the design goals of FindU scheme. One of the main
goals is to defend against profiling attack defined in the previous section. We
let the user choose his level of security requirement that we discuss in the next
section. By definition, the party P1 search among all parties the best that
match with him, and at the end, the output of the algorithm will contain the
intersection set between his set query at the profile set of all other parties. By
launching FindU, and adversary may obtains all those informations. Thus, we
let the user choose his privacy level. The main security goal is to thwart user
profiling attack. Since the users may have different privacy requirement, and as
it takes different amount of effort in protocol run to achieve them, we hereby
define three levels of privacy where a higher level leaks less information to the
adversary. Note that, by default, all of the following include letting P1 and the
best match Pi∗ learn the intersection set between them at the end of a protocol
run.
• Privacy level 1 (PL-1). When the protocol ends, P1 and each candidate
Pi, 1 < i ≤ N , mutually learn the intersection set between them, that is,
I1,i = S1 ∩ Si. An adversary A should learn nothing beyond what can be
derived from the above outputs and private inputs.
If we assume the adversary has unbounded computing power, PL-1 ac-
tually corresponds to unconditional security for all the parties under the
HBC model . Obviously, in PL-1, P1 can obtain all candidates’ intersec-
tion sets just in one protocol run, thus it reveals too much user information
to the attacker, if he assume the role of P1.
Therefore we define privacy level 2 in the following.
• Privacy level 2 (PL-2). When the protocol ends, P1 and each candidate
Pi, 1 < i ≤ N , mutually learn the size of their intersection set: m1,i =
|S1 ∩ Si|. In addition, the best match Pi∗ is allowed to know m1,i values
of other Pis. The adversary A should learn nothing beyond what can be
derived from the above outputs and its private inputs.
• Privacy level 3 (PL-3). At the end of the protocol, P1 and each Pi
should only learn the ranks of each value m1,i, 1 < i ≤ N . A should learn
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nothing more than what can be derived from the outputs and its private
inputs.
In PL-3, we can require that P1 only contacts the best match Pi∗ , such
that it only obtains the intersection set I1,i with the best match. In this
way, A will need at least N−1 protocol runs to know all other user’s exact
information, such that A’s profiling capability is much limited
Authors of FindU suggest that the protocol should be lightweight and practical,
i.e., being enough efficient in computation and communication to be used in
MSN. This is why we suggest to introduce homomorphism encryption into the
FindU protocol. Readers are referred to [10] for a complete decryption of FindU.
In order to achieve PL-2, authors introduce homomorphism encryption over
cypher-text. For our part, to reduce largely the energy consumption, we suggest
to use elliptic curve based encryption. The Blind and Permute Protocol (BP),
part of the FindU system, is presented in the next section, whereas the proposed
improvement is detailed in Section 5.
4 Blind and Permute Protocol (BP)
The input to BP protocol is a sequence S = (s1, ..., sn) of integer values that is
componentwise additively split between A who has S′ = (s′
1
, ..., s′n) and B who
has S′′ = (s′′1 , ..., s
′′
n), suchthatS = S
′+S′′ [12], where + stands for the vectorial
addition of integers. The output is a sequence Sˆ obtained from S by:
1. permuting the entries of S according to a random permutation pi that is
known to neither A nor B,
2. modifying the additive split of the entries of S so that neither A nor B can
use their share of it to gain any information about pi. We seek a protocol
that does this in linear computation and communication complexity.
Observe that it suffices to give a protocol that does half of the job: It blinds and
permutes for A according to a random permutation chosen by B. Then we can
use such protocol a second time with the roles A and B reversed, resulting in a
permutation that is the composition of two random permutations: one chosen
by B and unknown to A, another chosen by A and unknown to B. The protocol
where B chooses the permutation is given next.
1. A computes and sends EA(s′1), ..., EA(s
′
n) to B (here E is the cryptosystem
defined in [12] whose performance is compared to our scheme in section
7).
2. B selects n random numbers r1, ..., rn, and for every i ∈ 1, ..., n he com-
putes EA(−ri) and multiplies it by the EA(s′i) he received in the first step,
thereby obtaining EA(s′i − ri).
3. B generates a random permutation piB and applies it to the sequence of
EA(s′i − ri)’s computed in the previous step, obtaining a sequence of the
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form EA(v′1), ..., EA(v
′
n) that he sends to A. He also applies piB to the
sequence s′′1 + r1, ..., s
′′
n + rn, obtaining a sequence v
′′
1 , ..., v
′′
n. Note that
the sequence v′
1
+ v′′
1
, ..., v′n + v
′′
n is a permuted version of S (permuted
according to piB).
4. A decrypts the n items EA(v′1), ..., EA(v
′
n) received from B, obtaining the
sequence v′
1
, ..., v′n.
In the FindU algorithm (advanced version), BP permit achieving PL-2 level of
security.
5 Homomorphism Encryption
We use elliptic curves based cryptography to construct homomorphism encryp-
tion function.
5.1 Operation over Elliptic Curves
5.1.1 Addition and Multiplication
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is an approach to public-key cryptography
based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curve over finite fields [13]. Elliptic
curves used in cryptography are typically defined over two types of finite fields:
prime fields Fp, where p is a large prime number, and binary extension fields
F2m [14]. In our paper, we focus on elliptic curves over Fp. Let p > 3, then an
elliptic curve over Fp is defined by cubic equation y2 = x3 + ax+ b as the set
Σ = {(x, y) ∈ Fp × Fp | y2 ≡ x3 + ax+ b (mod p)}
where a, b ∈ Fp are constants such that 4a3+27b2 6= 0 (mod p). An elliptic curve
over Fp consists of the set of all pairs of affine coordinates (x, y) for x, y ∈ Fp
that satisfy an equation of the above form and an infinity point O. The point
addition and its special case, point doubling over Σ, is defined as follows (the
arithmetic operations are defined in Fp [16]). Let P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2)
be two points of Σ. Then:
P +Q =
{
O if x2 = x1 and y2 = −y1,
(x3, y3) otherwise.
where:
• x3 = λ2 − x1 − x2,
• y3 = λ× (x1 − x3)− y1,
• λ =
{
(y2 − y1)× (x2 − x1)−1 if P 6= Q,
(3x2
1
+ a)× (2y−1
1
if P = Q.
Finally, we define P +Q = O+P = P, ∀P ∈ Σ, which leads to an abelian group
(σ,+). The multiplication n×P means P +P + ...+P n times, and −P is the
symmetric of P for the group law + defined above, for all P ∈ Σ.
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5.1.2 Public/Private Keys Generation with ECC
In this section we show how we can generate the public and private keys for
encryption, following the cryptosystem proposed by Boneh et al. [15]. Let t > 0
be an integer called “security parameterâĂŹâĂŹ. To generate public and private
keys, first of all, two t − bits prime numbers must be computed. Therefore, a
cryptographic pseudorandom generator can be used to obtain two vectors of t
bits, q1 and q2. Then, a Miller-Rabin test can be applied for testing the primality
or not of q1 and q2. We denote by n the product of q1 and q2, n = q1 × q2,
and by l the smallest positive integer such that p = l × n − 1. l is a prime
number while p = 2 (mod 3). In order to find the private and public keys, we
define a group H , which presents the points of the super-singular elliptic curve
y2 = x3 + 1 defined over Fp. It consists of p + 1 = n × l points, and thus has
a subgroup of order n, we call it G. In another step, we compute g and u as
two generators of G and h = q2×u. Then, following [16], the public key will be
presented by (n,G, g, h) and the private key by q1.
5.1.3 Encryption and Decryption
After the private/public keys generation, we proceed now to the encryption and
decryption phases:
• Encryption: Assuming that our message space consists of integers in the
set 0, 1, ..., T , where T < q2, and m the (integer) message to encrypt.
First, a random positive integer is picked from te interval [0, n−1]. Then,
the cypher-text is defined by
C = m× g + r × h ∈ G,
in which + and × refer to the additive and multiplication laws defined
previously.
• Decryption: once the message C arrived to destination, to decrypt it, we
use the private key q1 and the discrete logarithm of base q1× g as follows:
m = logq1×gq1 × C
5.2 Homomorphic Properties
As we have mentioned before, our approach ensures easy encryption/decryption
without any need of extra resources. This will be proved in the next section.
Moreover, our approach supports homomorphic properties, which gives us the
ability to execute operations on values even though they have been encrypted.
Indeed, it allows N additions and one multiplication directly on cryptograms.
As the product operation will not be used in the profile matching, we will not
detail it in this section Addition aver cypher-texts are done as follows: let m1
and m2 be two messages and C1, C2 their cypher-text respectively. Then the
sum of C1 and C2, let call C, is represented by C = C1 + C2 + r × h where r
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is an integer randomly chosen in [0, n − 1] and h = q2 × u as presented in the
previous section. This sum operation guarantees that the decryption value of
C is the sum m1 +m2.
6 The modified version of BP Protocol
We rewrite the protocol BP with our novel cryptosystem with E meaning the
novel algorithm.
1. A computes and sends EA(s′1), ..., EA(s
′
n) to B.
2. B selects n random numbers r1, ..., rn, and for every i ∈ 1, ..., n he com-
putes EA(−ri) and add it with the EA(s′i) he received in the first step,
thereby obtaining EA(s′i − ri).
3. B generates a random permutation piB and applies it to the sequence of
EA(s′i − ri)’s computed in the previous step, obtaining a sequence of the
form EA(v′1), ..., EA(v
′
n) that he sends to A. He also applies piB to the
sequence s′′1 + r1, ..., s
′′
n + rn, obtaining a sequence v
′′
1 , ..., v
′′
n. Note that
the sequence v′
1
+ v′′
1
, ..., v′n + v
′′
n is a permuted version of S (permuted
according to piB).
4. A decrypts the n items EA(v′1), ..., EA(v
′
n) received from B, obtaining the
sequence v′1, ..., v
′
n
7 Performance Analysis
The experimental results presented in [13] compare the performance comparison
between RSA and ECC. For the same level of security, say level one, a device
operating over RSA need a key of 472 bits while over ECC we need only a key
of 46 bits. In [12], authors give a performance analysis between a cryptosystem
based on Composite Degree Residuosity Classes CDRC, which is the scheme
that is proposed in the BP algorithm. First, RSA is better then CDRC in term
of computational complexity. CDRC offer a security level equivalent to Class[n]
while RSA is equivalent to RSA[n,F4] and we have [12]
RSA[n,F4]⇒ Class[n]
On the other hand, for the same key size, CDRC require 5120 elementary op-
erations for encryption while RSA need only 17 operations. All those results
prove the efficiency of ECC in term of performance.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
An homomorphic encryption scheme that enhances the performance of the
FindU algorithm has been proposed in this document. Achieving the PL-3
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security level is the main open problem not yet resolved. In future work, homo-
morphic encryption will be investigated in order to solve this issue.
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